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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RANDALL LAW, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020578-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for eleven counts of securities fraud, six second 
degree felonies and five third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 
(1997), eleven counts of transacting business as a broker-dealer or agent without a license, all 
third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (1997), eleven counts of 
selling an unregistered security, all third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§61-1-7(1997), and one count of engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 (1995). This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does the record support defendant's claim on appeal that Judge Ray M. Harding 
was under the influence of illegal drugs at the sentencing hearing or was otherwise abusing 
drugs at the time of sentencing, thereby (1) causing the judge to abuse his discretion in 
sentencing defendant, (2) depriving defendant of his due process rights, and (3) creating a 
conflict of interest? 
Standard of Review. The record includes no evidence that Judge Harding was under 
the influence of drugs or otherwise abusing drugs at the time of sentencing. "An appellate 
court's 'review is . . . limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal.'" State v. 
Pliego, 1999 UT 8, H 7,974 P.2d 279 (quoting Wilderness Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. Chapman, 699 
P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985)). 
2. Did the trial court act within its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences 
on all thirty-four of defendant's securities-related felony convictions? 
Standard of Review. Subject to the limits prescribed by law, sentencing "rests entirely 
within the discretion of the court." State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Utah 1984). 
Therefore, this Court will not set aside a trial court's sentencing decision unless it finds an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1999) 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of 
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently 
unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
* * * 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances cf the offenses 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in 
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of 
a single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum 
of all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except 
as provided under Subsection 6(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection 6(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the 
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii)the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on 
conduct which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are 
imposed. 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Summary of Proceedings 
Defendant was charged with eleven counts of securities fraud, eleven counts of 
transacting business as a broker-dealer or agent without a license, eleven counts of selling an 
unregistered security, and one count of racketeering. R. 72-78. Following a preliminary 
hearing, defendant was bound over for trial on all counts. R. 81-88. Pursuant to a plea 
agreement reached eight months later, defendant pled guilty to all 34 counts and agreed to 
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pay $3.2 million in restitution by May 2002. R. 203, 216; R. 267: 7-14. In exchange, 
sentencing was postponed and the State agreed to a reduction in degree of the first six counts 
to class A misdemeanors and to the dismissal of the remaining counts so long as restitution 
was paid in full by May 2002. R. 203,216,223; R. 267:15-16. When defendant failed to 
pay the restitution by May 2002, the court sentenced him to consecutive prison terms of one-
to-fifteen years for each second degree felony conviction and zero-to-fr re years for each third 
degree felony conviction. R. 246,254-61. Defendant timely appealed. R. 263. 
Summary of Proceedings 
Because defendant did not include a transcript of the preliminary hearing in the record 
on appeal, the State cannot include a summary of the facts constituting defendant's crimes. 
Suffice it to say, however, that through Petral Capital, a domestic capital venture company, 
and Sun Co., an offshore bank debenture company in Antigua, defendant defrauded more 
than one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) from prospective investors. See R. 5-16, 72-78; 
Summary of Investigative Findings (SIF), at 1-2, attached to PSI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Nothing in the record supports defendant's assertion that Judge Harding was abusing 
drugs or was under the influence of drugs at the time of sentencing. Accordingly, 
defendant's claims that the alleged drug abuse resulted in an abuse of discretion at 
sentencing, a violation of defendant's due process rights, and a conflict of interest fail. This 
court should strike the newspaper articles in the addendum to defendant's brief because they 
are not included in the record. 
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive 
prison terms. Contrary to defendant's claim, the statutory factors in this case warranted the 
consecutive sentences. Defendant's fraudulent scheme resulted in losses to victims of more 
than $ 1,000,000.00. In addition to their financial losses, many victims suffered tremendous 
emotional consequences, including strained marriages, loss of time with family, and even 
thoughts of suicide. Finally, defendant demonstrated a pervasive pattern of fraud, even after 
he pled guilty. In light of these factors, it cannot be said that no reasonable person would 
impose such a sentence. Nor does the sentence impede the Board of Pardons' flexibility to 
release defendant early if mitigating circumstances warrant it. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE RECORD CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE THAT JUDGE HARDING 
WAS ABUSING OR UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ILLEGAL DRUGS 
AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING 
Defendant contends that Judge Harding abused his discretion at sentencing because 
"he was regularly abusing drugs and suffering the physical consequences of the drugs," Aplt. 
Brf. at 8-10, that defendant's rights to due process and procedural fairness at sentencing were 
violated as a result of Judge Harding's '^undisclosed abuse of illegal drugs[ ] and the physical 
and mental affects of such drug abuse," Aplt. Brf. at 13-14, and that Judge Harding's illegal 
drug abuse represented a conflict of interest and "infringed on his ability to perform his 
judicial duties without bias or prejudice," Aplt. Brf. at 14-17. These claims fail for lack of 
record support. 
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Nothing in the record supports defendant's claim that Judge Harding was abusing 
drugs or was under the influence of drugs at the time of sentencing. In support of his claim, 
defendant cites to three articles from The Daily Herald, not included in the record, describing 
his pending criminal and divorce proceedings. See Aplt. Brf. at 5-6, 8. However, the law is 
well settled that "[a]n appellate court's 'review i s . . . limited to the evidence contained in the 
record on appeal.'" State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, U 7,974 P.2d 279 (quoting Wilderness Bldg. 
Sys.f Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985)). Defendant has nevertheless 
attempted to supplement the record by including in the addendum to his brief the newspaper 
articles upon which he relies. See Aplt. Brf., Addenda A-C. As held by the Supreme Court 
in Pliego, "an appellant's addendum may not consist of evidence that is outside the record on 
appeal." Pliego, 1999 UT 8, at f 7. The Court should therefore "strike this extraneous 
evidence and [ ] not consider it for purposes of this appeal." See Id} 
Because the record contains no evidence of Judge Harding's alleged drug use, this 
Court will not consider it on appeal. Id. Accordingly, defendant's claims based on Judge 
Harding's alleged drug abuse fail. 
1
 Even if the newspaper articles were properly included in the record, they would have 
no probative value because they are nothing more than hearsay reports of pending court 
proceedings, the final disposition of which have not been decided. See Utah R. Evid. 802 
(providing that hearsay evidence is not admissible). 
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11. IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS WAS WITHIN 
THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
Defendant contends that even absent any allegation of drug abuse, imposition of 
consecutive sentences constituted an abuse of the court's discretion. Aplt. Brf. at 10-12. He 
complains that the trial court did not "fully" consider certain statutory factors. Aplt. Brf. at 
12. However, "the fact that [defendant] views his situation differently than did the trial court 
does not prove that the trial court neglected to consider the [statutory] factors." State v. 
Helms, 2002 UT 12, at \ 14,40 P.3d 626. "[T]he burden is on [defendant] to show that the 
trial court did not properly consider all the factors." Id. at 16. He has not met this burden. 
Subject to the limits prescribed by law, sentencing "rests entirely within the discretion 
of the [trial] court." State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210,1219 (Utah 1984). Where a defendant 
has been found guilty of multiple felony offenses, the trial court may impose concurrent or 
consecutive sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1). The trial court may impose 
consecutive sentences for multiple crimes even if the offenses were committed in the course 
of a single criminal episode. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(5). In determining whether or not 
to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must "consider the gravity and circumstances 
of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah 
Code Ann. §76-3-401(4). 
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Although the Supreme Court has stated that section 76-3-401 favors concurrent 
sentences, State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993),2 it has also emphasized that 
appellate courts "afford the trial court wide latitude in sentencing," State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 
66, f 66, 52 P.2d 1210. Accordingly, a trial court's sentencing decision will not be set aside 
absent a clear abuse of discretion. See State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)/see 
also Bluff, 2002 UT 66, at f 66. "To do otherwise would have a chil^-e effect on the trial 
court which has the main responsibility for sentencing . . . . " Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. 
An abuse of discretion may be found if the trial court did not consider all legally relevant 
factors or if the sentence is inherently unfair or clearly excessive. State v. Schweitzer, 943 
P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997). The appellate court, however, will not find an abuse of 
discretion unless it concludes "that 'no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by 
the trial court.'" Id. (quoting Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887). 
2
 The Supreme Court in Strunk cited Section 76-3-401(1) in support of the proposition 
that the statute favors concurrent sentences. That section provides: "Sentences for state 
offenses shall run concurrently unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run 
consecutively." Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301. Thus, contrary to the court's conclusion, that 
section does not favor concurrent sentences, but simply creates a presumption that a trial 
court intended the sentences to be served concurrently if the court was silent on the issue. 
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Citing State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), defendant argues that his sentences 
should have been concurrent because (1) "all the felony counts are considered 'white collar' 
offenses" involving "no physical injuries to any victims," (2) he "accepted full responsibility 
for his actions and a willingness to make restitution," and (3) he has "no prior criminal 
history." Aplt. Brf. at 13. Defendant's reliance on Galli, however, is misplaced. 
In Galli, defendant was sentenced by three different courts to consecutive prison terms 
of five years to life based on his pleas of guilty to three armed robberies. Galli, 967 P.2d at 
932-33. The Supreme Court reversed the consecutive prison sentences after concluding that 
the trial courts did not properly consider a number of mitigating circumstances. Id. at 938. 
For example, the amount of money taken was "relatively small" (approximately $ 1,500). Id. 
932,938. Galli injured no one and used a pellet gun "incapable of inflicting serious injury." 
Id. at 938. Galli had only minor traffic offenses and one misdemeanor theft conviction. Id. 
Galli voluntarily confessed, admitted responsibility, and expressed a commitment to improve. 
Id. Finally, he demonstrated promise for rehabilitation, going three years without violating 
the law after his arrest but before sentencing. Id. 
In this case, the trial court read "in full" the presentence investigation report (PSI). 
R. 291: 3. A review of that PSI reveals that unlike Galli, the mitigating circumstances here 
fall far short of compelling concurrent sentences. 
Where the amount of money taken by Galli was relatively small, the amount taken by 
defendant was enormous. His victims lost more than one million dollars ($1,027,250.00). 
R. 291: 10; PSI at 7. This amount, however, apparently represented only the tip of the 
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iceberg in terms of the amount he had taken. As part of the plea bargain, defendant agreed to 
pay $3.2 million in restitution to victims of his fraudulent schemes. R. 216; R. 267: 5. In all, 
his deception reached out to more than 30 victims in this scheme alone. PSI at 3. 
As in Galli, defendant inflicted no physical injuries upon his victims. However, his 
fraud and deceit inflicted an incalculable emotional toll on many of his victims with long-
lasting effects. At defendant's sentencing, one victim eloquently de^~ribed the emotional 
impact of defendant's crimes as follows: 
Just because of his 34 crimes that he pled guilty to were not done at 
gunpoint doesn't make them less of a crime. He chooses lies and deceit as his 
weapons. These weapons do create victims. People have lost homes. There 
have been divorces, bankruptcies, and a multitude of personal suffering that 
this man has created with his weapons of lies and deceit. 
R. 291: 7; see also R. 291: 6-7; PSI at 3-6,12 (victims attesting to loss of homes, retirement 
funds, and savings, forcing some into bankruptcy). One victim described the "emotional and 
physical stress" on his family, taking both him and his wife away from their children because 
his wife was forced to go to work and he was forced to work longer days. PSI at 4. Another 
described the strain caused on his marriage. PSI at 5. Still another told of his thoughts of 
suicide because defendant had "ruined [their] lives." PSI at 6. 
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While defendant had no prior criminal history, the PSI revealed that he was presently 
under indictment on several counts of mail fraud by the United States Attorney's Office in 
Chicago in connection with another investment scheme. PSI at 8.3 The PSI also revealed 
that defendant had been defrauding people through various schemes for years. See PSI. 
Although defendant verbally accepted responsibility by pleading guilty to the charges 
and agreeing to pay restitution, his actions following the plea bargain have not demonstrated 
that acceptance. He promised to pay $3.2 million to victims within six months. Yet, in his 
statement to AP & P, defendant said he was "broke." PSI at 10. He failed to report to 
AP & P to assist in the preparation of a PSI, resulting in his incarceration pending sentencing. 
PSI at 7. And in the statement he gave to AP & P at the jail, he deflected responsibility to 
his partner and contacts. PSI at 3. He also attributed the inability to keep their promises to 
"complications" and "delays." PSI at 3. Nowhere did he acknowledge his deceit and utter 
failure to obey the law. See PSI at 3. 
Finally, defendant's conduct following the change of plea hearing also demonstrates 
little to no promise of rehabilitation. Twice while defendant was on pretrial release in this 
case he was arrested on new charges of fraud by authorities in Utah County. R. 291: 5. Even 
as he sat in jail awaiting sentencing, defendant reported as a potential asset a formula for non-
A search of Westlaw reveals that defendant and his co-defendants were subsequently 
convicted. See United States v. Loutos, 2003 WL 168627 (N.D. 111. Jan. 24, 2003). In 
accordance with the holding in Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, f 16,44 P.3d 734, a 
copy of that opinion is included in the Addendum. 
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dairy milk which he believed "has the potential to earn him a sufficient amount of money if it 
could be marketed." PSI at 10. Thus, notwithstanding his securities fraud convictions here, 
his pending mail fraud charges in Illinois, and injunctions imposed by the federal Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), defendant was still intent on making money through 
investment schemes. See SIF at 1. 
Defendant also contends that the consecutive sentences are "vast11/ disproportionate to 
his offense" and are otherwise clearly excessive. Aplt. Brf. at 12. However, he offers no 
other reason to support this claim. Because section 76-3-401 limits the aggregate maximum 
of all sentences imposed to 30 years, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-40 l(6)(a), defendant's sentence 
is the equivalent of an indeterminate prison sentence of 7 to 30 years. Contrary to 
defendant's claim, this is not an inherently unfair sentence given the number of lives 
defendant has affected, the toll his crimes have placed on victims both financially and 
emotionally, and defendant's pervasive pattern of fraud, even after pleading guilty to the 
charges here. Indeed, a single conviction for similar crimes under federal law subjects a 
defendant to prison terms comparable to that which defendant received here. See, e.g., 15 
U.S.C.A. § 77x (2002) (5 years for securities fraud); 18U.S.C.A. § 1341 (2002) (20 years for 
mail fraud); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (2002) (20 years for wire fraud). In other words, it cannot 
be said "that 'no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court."' 
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651 (quoting Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887). 
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Nor can it be said that the sentence improperly impedes the flexibility of the Board of 
Pardons to adjust defendant's prison stay to match his progress and rehabilitation. The 
magnitude of the financial losses incurred (> $1 million), the emotional devastation suffered 
by defendant's victims (seven named in the information), and defendant's pervasive pattern 
of fraud, even after he pled guilty, make it eminently reasonable that defendant serve at least 
seven years in prison. Even then, the Board of Pardons has the authority fn release defendant 
before his minimum term has been served if mitigating circumstances so warrant. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-27-9(1 )(b) (1999). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's sentences. The State also requests the Court to strike the newspaper articles 
included in defendant's addendum. 
Respectfully submitted on February 6, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
^^Ep^REY S. GRAY ^ 
/^^Cssistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
F:\Jgray\Law\Law Ran brf.doc 
02/06/2003 4:19 PM 
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Geoffrey L. Clark 
2650 Washington Blvd., Ste. 101 
Ogden,UT 84401 
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ADDENDUM 
Slip Copy 
(Cite as: 2003 WL 168627 (N.D.II1.)) 
Page I 
H 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. FN1. This charge and conduct will be 
referred to as "bank fraud." 
United States District Court, 
N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Peter A. LOUTOS, Sr., Defendant. 
No. 01 CR 852-3. 
Jan. 24,2003. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
HART, J. 
*1 Defendant Peter Loutos pleaded guilty to one 
count of making a false statement on an application 
for the purpose of influencing a federally insured 
bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 1014 and 2. [FN1] 
The preliminary Sentencing Guideline calculation 
contained in the Plea Agreement applied U.S.S.G. § 
2F1.1 [FN2] and determined a total offense level of 
four and a criminal history category of I for a 
sentencing range of zero to six months. The 
Presentence Report ("PSR") that has been prepared 
reached the same sentencing range, but by applying 
Guideline 2B1.1 of the current Guidelines Manual. 
At the time of the plea colloquy, the court deferred 
acceptance of the plea. After hearing the evidence 
that was presented at the trial of Loutos's 
codefendants and having considered the PSR, 
submissions of the parties, and possible Guideline 
results, on January 23, 2003, die court accepted 
Loutos's plea of guilty. However, a determination of 
the appropriate sentencing range will only be made 
after considering additional facts not presently 
disclosed in the Plea Agreement or PSR. A final 
determination as to the appropriate sentencing range 
will not be made until after die parties have had an 
adequate opportunity to address the additional facts. 
The purpose of today's order is to (a) outline 
additional issues and facts that the court will consider 
for purposes of sentencing Loutos and (b) set forth a 
schedule and procedures that will provide the parties 
with an adequate opportunity to address the 
additional issues and facts. Most of the issues 
mentioned herein were previously indicated to the 
parties in the December 27, 2002 Minute Order and 
at the January 23, 2003 status hearing. 
FN2. Guideline 2F1.1 is not contained in the 
current (Nov.2002) Guidelines Manual. The 
Plea Agreement does not specify which 
year's Guidelines Manual was relied upon. 
/. Background 
The original indictment in this case alleged: 
defendants FRANK PbiTZ, DANIEL BENSON, 
PETER LOUTOS, ROBERT PALADINO, 
RANDALL LAW, MONICA ILES and others, 
through FLP Capital, Active International [, Inc.] 
and Lennox [Investment Group, Ltd.], sought to 
and did obtain and retain funds from prospective 
investors and investors by offering and selling 
investments purportedly in the international trading 
of bank financial instruments. In offering and 
selling these investments, the defendants made and 
caused to be made material misrepresentations and 
omissions about, among other things: the risk 
involved in the investment; the expected return on 
the investment; the use of money raised from 
investors; and the previous investment experience 
and the criminal and regulatory background of 
thoseoffering and selling the investment. As a part 
of the scheme, the defendants raised over 
$11,000,000 from at least 30 investors and then 
misappropriated almost all of the funds for their 
own benefit. In order to retain the use of investors' 
funds and obtain additional funds from new 
investors and to conceal various parts of the 
scheme from victim investors and others, 
defendants continued to lull investors through a 
series of misrepresentations and omissions about 
the nature and status of their investments as well as 
by repaying earlier, disgruntled investors with 
fimds from new investors. 
*2 Indictment % 3. 
All six defendants were charged with eight 
substantive counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § § 1343 and 2. The alleged wire 
communications underlying these counts occurred 
from October 10,1996 through May 22, 1997. [FN3] 
Defendants Peitz, Benson, Loutos, and Paladino were 
also charged with a conspiracy in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1956(h) under which they agreed to (1) 
conduct financial transactions involving the proceeds 
of the wire fraud scheme in order to promote the 
scheme in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i); 
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(2) engage in wire fraud violations that were 
designed to conceal the source and ownership of 
unlawful proceeds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(a)(l)(B)(i); and (3) engage in monetary 
transactions in criminally derived property with a 
value greater than $10,000 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1957(a). The conspiracy allegedly began no later than 
October 1994 and continued until at least June 1998. 
The four alleged conspirators were also charged with 
five substantive counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § § 
1957 and 2 and two substantive counts of violating 
18 U.S.C. § § 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) and 2. 
FN3. The wire fraud scheme will be referred 
to as "investment fraud ." 
During pretrial proceedings in this case, a large 
volume of potential documentary evidence was made 
available for inspection by the defendants. As of 
September 11, 2002, the trial of all six defendants 
was set for November 4, 2002. On October 23, 2002, 
the government submitted its ''Santiago" proffer. See 
United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th 
Cir.1978); United States v. Centracchio, 265 F.3d 
518, 522 & n. 1 (7th Cir.2001). The proffer assumed 
Loutos was going to trial and outlined the factual 
support for finding Loutos to be a member of the 
charged conspiracy and for admitting against him the 
statements of his alleged coconspirators. However, 
on October 30, 2002, a superseding information was 
filed and Loutos pleaded guilty to the one bank fraud 
charge contained in the information. The offense to 
which Loutos pleaded guilty occurred in June 1996. 
As had been scheduled, the trial of Loitfos's 
codefendants began on November 4, 2002. On 
December 11, 2002, the jury returned a verdict of 
guilty as to all counts and defendants, except that 
they returned a verdict of not guilty as to one count 
(Count 13) of violating § 1957. Sentencing for the 
five defendants who went to trial is presently set for 
March 12, 2003. 
//. Opportunity To Be Heard 
A defendant must be provided with an adequate 
opportunity to address those issues and facts that will 
be considered in determining his or her sentence. See 
United States v. Jackson, 32 F.3d 1101, 1105-09 (7th 
Cir.1994). 
In summary, we reiterate that Rule 32 and § 6A1.3 
of the Guidelines require both reasonable advance 
notice, i.e., knowledge, of the ground on which the 
district court is contemplating an enhancement as 
well as a meaningful opportunity to challenge the 
issue. The right to challenge a sentencing issue 
encompasses the right to present favorable 
evidence, including the presentation of witnesses 
when appropriate under U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3. 
Advance notice means that prior to the sentencing 
hearing the defense must be informed via the PSR, 
the prosecutor's recommendation or the court that a 
specific sentencing enhancement is being 
contemplated, e.g., an abuse of trust enhancement. 
When defense counsel is unaware until the 
sentencing hearing is in progress that the court is 
considering an enhancement, counsel is denied an 
opportunity to prepare and call witnesses, as 
allowed under U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, much less to 
present evidence on disputed facts. Moreover, he is 
not permitted adequate :ui:e •;•> prepare case law 
challenging the adequacy of the Guideline factor as 
it applies to the factual circumstances at hand. 
*3W. at 1108-09. 
Today's order will set forth pertinent issues that will 
be considered at the time of sentencing. [FN4] 
Today's order also outlines additional facts and 
evidence that will be considered at the time of 
sentencing. Further, the government will be required 
to provide Loutos and the probation officer [FN5] 
with a copy of the government version of the offense 
that has been prepared for the sentencing of the other 
five defendants, as well as a supplemental statement 
regarding Loutos. In accordance with the schedule set 
forth in § IX below, the parties will be provided the 
opportunity to submit sentencing memoranda 
addressing the issues. 
FN4. In a minute order dated December 27, 
2002, the court summarily set forth some 
issues for the parties to address. The 
government's one- paragraph filing failed to 
address any of the issues set forth in the 
minute order. Defendant's January 15, 2003 
Memorandum addressed some, but not all, 
of the pertinent issues. Some potential issues 
were also discussed at the January 23, 2003 
status hearing. Today's order will ensure that 
the parties are aware of the pertinent issues 
that need to be addressed and that they have 
a fair opportunity to address them. 
FN5. As to any further sentencing 
memoranda or sentence-related documents 
that the parties file with the court, they shall 
also provide a copy to the probation officer. 
In his January 15, 2003 Memorandum ("January 15 
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Memorandum"), Loutos pointed out that the 
government had not contended there is any relevant 
conduct nor does the PSR recite any and, further, 
"defendant, not having been present or represented at 
the trial and with no discovery on this issue, is not 
aware of what specific facts the Court intends to 
consider concerning any alleged relevant conduct." 
That statement is somewhat disingenuous. Although 
Loutos did not attend the trial of his codefendants, 
Loutos was actively involved in preparing for trial 
until shortly before his codefendants went to trial. 
Loutos had access to and took the opportunity to 
examine the voluminous amount of documents that 
were made available in pretrial proceedings. He also 
received the government's Santiago proffer outlining 
evidence of his involvement in the conspiracy. 
Defendant is also well aware of the wire fraud 
scheme that was charged in the original indictment. 
While defendant may not be aware of how the 
evidence specifically played out at trial, he is well 
aware of what evidence was available for trial and is 
well aware of the contours of the charged scheme. 
Moreover, while a dispute possibly exists as to the 
amount of loss, it is probably more likely that Loutos 
has little dispute as to the amount of loss that was 
caused by the wire fraud scheme. Instead, the likely 
area of dispute is Loutos's involvement in the wire 
fraud scheme. In any event, today's order and the 
procedures set forth herein provide Loutos with 
adequate notice of the facts and evidence at issue. 
Additionally, the transcript of the trial will be 
available prior to the date a final determination will 
be made as to Loutos's sentence. 
///. Sentencing Evidence 
Facts found for purposes of applying the Sentencing 
Guidelines in this case must be found by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. 
Smith. 308 F.3d 726, 743-45 (7th Cir.2002). Since 
any sentence that will be imposed will be below the 
30-year statutory maximum applicable to violations 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1014, there is no Apprendi problem 
that requires that any additional facts be either 
admitted by defendant or proven before a jury. See 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Smith, 
308F.3dat745. 
Findings for purposes of sentencing may be based on 
any reliable evidence, including hearsay or other 
evidence that would not ordinarily be admissible at 
trial. United States v. Schaefer, 291 F.3d 932, 942 
(7th Cir.2002); United States v. Martinez, 289 F.3d 
1023, 1028-29 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. 
Poison, 285 F.3d 563, 566 (7th Cir.2002); United 
States v. Chavez- Chavez, 213 F.3d 420, 422 (7th 
Cir.2000). At sentencing, the court may consider 
evidence that was before it in a trial, sentencing 
hearing, or plea of a codefendant. United States v 
Pippen, 115 F.3d 422, 425 (7th Cir.1997); United 
States v. Morales, 994 F.2d 386, 389-90 (7th 
Cir.1993); United States v. Hardamon, 188 F.3d 843, 
850 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Nesbitt. 
852 F.2d 1502, 1521-22 (7th Cir.1988), cert denied, 
488 U.S. 1015 (1989)). It is only necessary that the 
defendant receive sufficient notice that evidence from 
the other hearing will be considered and the 
opportunity to consider and respond to such 
evidence. See Morales, 994 F.2d at 389-90. Loutos 
has an adequate opportunitv to consider the evidence 
that was presented at the trial of his codefendants. 
Also, to the extent any codefendant is sentenced prior 
to Loutos and evidence from a codefendant's 
sentencing hearing is to be considered, Loutos will be 
provided the opportunity to consider and respond to 
any such evidence. 
IV. Provisions of Loutos's Plea Agreement 
*4 Paragraph 17 of Loutos's Plea Agreement, which 
concerns restitution, states in part: "The parties 
stipulate and agree that there was no loss resulting 
from the defendant's false claim." The Plea 
Agreement also contains the following provisions. 
After reciting facts underlying the offense, it is 
stated: "Defendant also admits that these facts are not 
a complete statement of defendant's knowledge of 
and involvement in the charged offense." Plea 
Agreement % 5. The government is permitted to 
correct errors in the Guideline calculation. Id. % 1 
("Errors in calculations or interpretation of any of the 
guidelines may be corrected by either party prior to 
sentencing."). Loutos may not withdraw his plea 
because such a correction is made. Id. Also, the Plea 
Agreement provides that the government is to "fully 
apprise the District Court and the United States 
Probation Office of the nature, scope and extent of 
defendant's conduct regarding the charges against 
him in this case, and related matters, including all 
matters in aggravation and mitigation relevant to the 
issue of sentencing." Id. % 14. Additionally, the Plea 
Agreement contains the standard provision that the 
court is not bound by the Agreement, id. ^ 16, and 
that the court makes the final determination as to the 
appropriate Guideline determination, id. % 6(e). 
Loutos may not withdraw his plea if the court reaches 
a different conclusion than the tentative Guideline 
calculation contained in the Plea Agreement. Id. 
The stipulation in ^ 17 refers only to losses resulting 
from defendant's false statement. This stipulation 
should probably be read as being limited to losses 
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directly resulting from the false statement bank fraud 
offense. The stipulation does not refer to any losses 
resulting from any possible relevant conduct and 
Loutos apparently so understands the stipulation in 
that his January 15 Memorandum treats relevant 
conduct and any related losses as being distinct from 
the issue of loss attributed to the bank fraud charge. 
See Jan. 15 Memo, at 4. 
Even if the stipulation contained in f 17 were to be 
construed broadly so as to apply to any possible 
losses attributed to Loutos, the court is not precluded 
from considering evidence that indicates otherwise. 
Guideline 6B 1.4(d), a policy statement, provides: 
"The court is not bound by the stipulation, but may 
with the aid of the presentence report, determine the 
facts relevant to sentencing." See also United States 
v. miliams, 198 F.3d 988, 994 (7th Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Mankiewicz, 122 F.3d 399, 403 n. 1 (7th 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Bennett, 990 F.2d 998, 
1003 (7th Cir. 1993). The commentary to Guideline 
6B1.4 provides in part: 
... [I]t is not appropriate for the parties to stipulate 
to misleading or non-existent facts, even when both 
parties are willing to assume the existence of such 
"facts" for purposes of the litigation. Rather, the 
parties should fully disclose the actual facts and 
then explain to the court the reasons why the 
disposition of the case should differ from that 
which such facts ordinarily would require under the 
guidelines. 
* * * 
*5 Section 6B 1.4(d) makes clear that the court is 
not obliged to accept the stipulation of the parties. 
Even though stipulations are expected to be 
accurate and complete, the court cannot rely 
exclusively upon stipulations in ascertaining the 
factors relevant to the determination of sentence. 
Rather, in determining the factual basis for the 
sentence, the court will consider the stipulation, 
together with the results of the presentence 
investigation, and any other relevant information. 
In the Plea Agreement, Loutos specifically admits 
that facts stated therein do not constitute a complete 
statement of Loutos's knowledge of and involvement 
in the offense. Evidence presented at his 
codefendants' trial supports that Loutos was aware of 
and knowingly and intentionally participated in the 
investment fraud offenses. [FN6] Paragraph 14 of the 
Plea Agreement expressly provides mat the 
government is to fully apprise both the court and 
probation officer of the extent of Loutos's conduct, 
including any matters in aggravation pertinent to his 
sentencing. Thus, both the Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 
6B1.4; Bennett, 990 F.2d at 1003; United States v 
Telesco, 962 F.2d 165, 168 (2d Cir.1992); United 
States v. Holland, 59 F.Supp.2d 492, 532 
(D.Md.1998), and the Plea Agreement place a duty 
on the government to be fully forthcoming regarding 
Loutos's involvement in possible relevant conduct. It 
may be that the government believes there are 
weaknesses in its case against Loutos that justified 
dropping allegations of involvement in a $14,000,000 
[FN7] wire fraud scheme and instead enter into a Plea 
Agreement possibly providing for a zero-to-six-
month sentencing range. However, if it so believed, 
the Guidelines provide that the government should 
disclose all pertinent facts and explain the basis for 
entering into the Plea A^re^ment. The government 
has not made such a representation. In all further 
filings, however, the government shall be fully 
forthcoming regarding the evidence related to Loutos. 
To the extent reasons exist for the nature of the Plea 
Agreement, the government may set forth such 
reasons where appropriate, but it still must also set 
forth those facts that may connect Loutos to the 
investment fraud. 
FN6. The court is not presently making a 
determination as to Loutos's knowledge and 
participation. It is only being noted that 
evidence was presented from which such a 
conclusion could have reasonably been 
reached. 
FN7. At the codefendants' trial, it was 
indicated that this figure represented the loss 
to investors resulting from the investment 
fraud and evidence was submitted to support 
this contention. 
V. Relevant Conduct 
As previously indicated, a key issue for Loutos's 
sentencing is whether the investment fraud that the 
jury found the codefendants were involved in 
constitutes relevant conduct for the bank fraud 
offense to which Loutos has pleaded guilty. 
Guideline IB 1.3(a) provides: 
(a) Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three 
(Adjustments). Unless otherwise specified, (i) the 
base offense level where the guideline specifies 
more than one base offense level, (ii) specific 
offense characteristics and (iii) cross references in 
Chapter Two, and (iv) adjustments in Chapter 
Three, shall be determined on the basis of the 
following: 
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(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, 
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, 
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and 
*6 (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal 
activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or 
enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert 
with others, whether or not charged as a 
conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and 
omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during 
the commission of the offense of conviction, in 
preparation for that offense, or in the course of 
attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for 
that offense; 
(2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for 
which § 3D 1.2(d) would require grouping of 
multiple counts, all acts and omissions described in 
subdivisions (1)(A) and (1)(B) above that were part 
of the same course of conduct or common scheme 
or plan as the offense of conviction; 
(3) all harm that resulted from the acts and 
omissions specified in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) 
above, and all harm that was the object of such acts 
and omissions; and 
(4) any other information specified in the 
applicable guideline. 
As to subsection (a)(1)(B), Application Note 2 
states: 
A "jointly undertaken criminal activity" is a 
criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise 
undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, 
whether or not charged as a conspiracy. 
In the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, 
subsection (a)(1)(B) provides that a defendant is 
accountable for the conduct (acts and omissions) of 
others that was both: 
(i) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal 
activity; and 
(ii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that 
criminal activity. 
Because a count may be worded broadly and 
include the conduct of many participants over a 
period of time, the scope of the criminal activity 
jointly undertaken by the defendant (the "jointly 
undertaken criminal activity") is not necessarily the 
same as the scope of the entire conspiracy, and 
hence relevant conduct is not necessarily the same 
for every participant. In order to determine the 
defendant's accountability for the conduct of others 
under subsection (a)(1)(B), the court must first 
determine the scope of the criminal activity the 
particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake 
(i.e., the scope of the specific conduct and 
objectives embraced by the defendant's agreement). 
The conduct of others that was both in furtherance 
of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with, 
the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the 
defendant is relevant conduct under this provision. 
The conduct of others that was not in furtherance 
of the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the 
defendant, or was not reasonably foreseeable in 
connection with that criminal activity, is not 
relevant conduct under this provision. 
Application Note 2 also specifically states: "Note 
that the criminal activity that the defendant agreed to 
jointly undertake, and the reasonably foreseeable 
conduct of others in furtherance of that criminal 
activity, are not necessar^y identical." 
*7 As to subsection (a)(2), Application Note 9 
provides: 
"Common scheme or plan" and "same course of 
conduct" are two closely related concepts. 
(A) Common scheme or plan. For two or more 
offenses to constitute part of a common scheme or 
plan, they must be substantially connected to each 
other by at least one common factor, such as 
common victims, common accomplices, common 
purpose, or similar modus operandi. For example, 
the conduct of five defendants who together 
defrauded a group of investors by computer 
manipulations that unlawfully transferred funds 
over an eighteen-month period would qualify as a 
common scheme or plan on the basis of any of the 
above listed factors; i.e., the commonality of 
victims (the same investors were defrauded on an 
ongoing basis), commonality of offenders (the 
conduct constituted an ongoing conspiracy), 
commonality of purpose (to defraud the group of 
investors), or similarity of modus operandi (the 
same or similar computer manipulations were used 
to execute the scheme). 
(B) Same course of conduct. Offenses that do not 
qualify as part of a common scheme or plan may 
nonetheless qualify as part of the same course of 
conduct if they are sufficiently connected or related 
to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they 
are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing 
series of offenses. Factors that are appropriate to 
the determination of whether offenses are 
sufficiently connected or related to each other to be 
considered as part of the same course of conduct 
include the degree of similarity of the offenses, the 
regularity (repetitions) of the offenses, and the time 
interval between the offenses. When one of the 
above factors is absent, a stronger presence of at 
least one of the other factors is required. For 
example, where the conduct alleged to be relevant 
is relatively remote to the offense of conviction, a 
stronger showing of similarity or regularity is 
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necessary to compensate for the absence of 
temporal proximity. The nature of the offenses may 
also be a relevant consideration (e.g., a defendant's 
failure to file tax returns in three consecutive years 
appropriately would be considered as part of the 
same course of conduct because such returns are 
only required at yearly intervals). 
Under subsection (a)(1)(B), the scope of Loutos's 
jointly undertaken activity must first be determined. 
The second step is then to determine which conduct 
of others was reasonably foreseeable. United States v. 
Thomas, 199 F.3d 950, 953-54 (7th Cir.1999). 
Loutos's knowledge of the investment fraud is 
relevant to both inquiries. Id. In his January 15 
Memorandum, Loutos contends there is no evidence 
that he had any knowledge of or knowingly joined in 
the criminal acts and conspiracy of the other 
defendants. In his plea, Loutos has admitted that he 
jointly acted with Benson in making false 
representations when opening a Lennox bank 
account. The evidence shows that Lennox was a 
company that engaged only in false and fraudulent 
transactions. It is clear from the evidence presented at 
the codefendants' trial that the bank fraud was an 
integral part of the investment fraud scheme proven 
at that trial. Evidence presented at the codefendants* 
trial also supported [FN8] that, besides making false 
statements in order to open the Lennox bank account, 
Loutos (a) aided in representations to investors that 
an actual escrow account existed; (b) allowed his 
attorney trust account to be used to launder funds; (c) 
made false statements in connection with an 
interpleader action; (d) aided in the distribution of 
bank confirmations bearing the name of his law firm; 
(e) aided in the transfer of investor funds, e.g., the 
transfer of $250,000 to a London company; (f) 
provided letters that aided the investment scheme, 
e.g., the August 2, 1996 letter to Law; (g) advised 
potential witnesses not to cooperate with fraud 
investigators; and (h) obtained some of the proceeds 
of the investment fraud. Besides being evidence that 
Loutos intentionally aided and participated in the 
investment fraud, Loutos's involvement provided him 
with information about die codefendants1 fraudulent 
investment activity. [FN9] It could be found from this 
evidence that Loutos was well aware of the 
fraudulent nature of the codefendants* investment 
activity or that the investment fraud of the others was 
reasonably foreseeable. From the aforementioned 
evidence, it could further be found that Loutos's 
agreement to engage in the bank fraud was part of an 
understanding that he was aiding the investment 
fraud as well. Therefore, it could be found that the 
investment fraud by Benson and others that followed 
the bank fraud was in furtherance of the bank fraud 
activity in which Loutos engaged. The evidence 
presented at the codefendants' trial could support a 
finding, under Guideline IB 1.3(a)(1)(B), that the 
investment fraud is relevant conduct. 
FN8. Again, it is only being stated that 
evidence was presented from which such a 
finding could reasonably be made. No final 
determination is presently being made 
regarding Loutos's knowledge or 
participation. 
FN9. At least as c»rl> as July 2, 1996, 
Loutos received a copy of a letter 
complaining that certain investor funds 
should be held in the purported escrow 
account. Govt. Exh. First of America No. 
68. 
*8 Alternatively, based on the evidence presented at 
the codefendants' trial, it could be found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Loutos was a 
member of the conspiracy as charged in Count 9 of 
the original indictment. That would support a finding 
that the investment fraud was relevant conduct to the 
bank fraud. See United States v. Gutierrez-Herrera, 
293 F.3d 373, 376 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. 
KubicK 205 F.3d 1117,1127-28 (9th Cir.1999). 
To the extent the investment fraud were to be found 
to be relevant conduct, the harm caused by the 
investment fraud would be part of the loss calculation 
in determining the offense level under the applicable 
Guideline. See U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(aX3); Schaefer, 
291F.3dat939. 
VI. Alternative Considerations 
Two other possibilities exist for considering the 
investment fraud loss in determining Loutos's 
sentencing range. The first is whether the investment 
loss would still be considered to have been caused by 
the bank fraud. See United States v. Seward, 272 F 
.3d 831, 839 (7th Cir.2001). If it is determined that 
Guideline 2B1.1 (2002) is the appropriate Guideline 
to apply, then the causation definitions contained in 
that Guideline would have to be considered. See 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 comment. (nn.2(AX0, 2{AXiv)) 
(2002). 
The other possibility is an upward departure in 
accordance with U .S.S.G. § 2F1.1 comment, (n. 
10(b)) (1995). That Note provides: "In cases in which 
the loss determined under (b)(1) does not fully 
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capture the harmfulness and seriousness of the 
conduct, an upward departure may be warranted. 
Examples may include the following: ... (b) false 
statements were made for the purpose of facilitating 
some other crime." In the event that the investment 
fraud is not found to be relevant conduct, it will be 
considered whether an upward departure is 
appropriate under this provision. Alternatively, if it 
were found that there is no ex post facto problem 
with applying the current version of Guideline 2B1.1, 
then the appropriate application note to consider 
regarding an upward departure from that Guideline is 
Application Note 15(A), including 15(A)(iv). 
VII Possible Guidelines Calculation and 
Adjustments 
If the investment fraud were to be found to be 
relevant conduct and the related loss found to be in 
excess of $10,000,000, the court has tentatively 
determined that the following adjustments would 
need to be considered in determining the total offense 
level. This is being set forth so as to enable the 
parties to address possible adjustments and other 
Guideline issues. As previously stated, whether or not 
the investment fraud is relevant conduct will not be 
determined until after the parties have had an 
adequate opportunity to address the issue. 
The parties stipulated that the applicable Guideline is 
2F1.1. Ordinarily, the Guidelines in effect at the time 
of sentencing are to be considered. U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.11(a) (2002). Effective November 1, 2001, 
Guideline 2F1.1 was deleted and instead incorporated 
in revised Guideline 2B1.1. See U.S.S.GApp. C, 
Amend. 617 (2001). However, the current version of 
Guideline 2B1.1 should not be used in the present 
case if it would violate the ex post facto clause of the 
Constitution, for example, because applying the 
current version produces a more detrimental result 
than applying the version in effect at the time of the 
commission of the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.11(b)(1) (2002); Schaefer, 291 F.3d at 936 n. 1; 
United States v. Kosmel, 272 F.3d 501, 507 (7th 
Cir.2001). In such situations, the Guidelines Manual 
in effect on the date of the offense shall be applied in 
its entirety. U.S.S.G. § IBM 1(b)(2) (2002). Because 
of Guideline 2Bl.rs loss table, see U.S.S.G. § 
2BM(b)(l)(K) (2002), and likely adjustment for 
using sophisticated means, see id. § 2BM(b)(8Xc), 
the offense level under the current Guidelines Manual 
would be higher than under the 1995 Guidelines 
Manual that was in effect when the offense was 
completed in June 1996. Therefore, the 1995 
Guidelines Manual will be employed in tentatively 
calculating Loutos's sentencing range. 
*9 Under the 1995 Guidelines Manual, the Guideline 
applicable to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 was 
Guideline 2F1.1. Under that Guideline, the base 
offense level and possible adjustments are 
determined as follows. 
The base offense level would be 6. U.S.S.G. § 
2Fl.l(a). 
The adjustment for a loss of more than $10,000,000 
would be 15 levels. U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1). 
There would be a possible enhancement of 2 levels 
because the offense involved more than one victim. 
See U.S.S.G. § 2F 1.1(b)(2)(B). Relevant conduct is 
to be considered in determining whether the offense 
involved more than one victim. See U.S.S.G. § § 
lB1.3(a)(ii), IB 1.3(a)(3); United States v. Lindsay, 
184 F.3d 1138, 1141 n. 3 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 
528 U.S. 981 (1999); United States v. Shumard, 120 
F.3d 339, 340 (2d Cir. 1997). 
There is a possible reduction of 2 levels for Loutos 
being a minor participant. See U.S.S.G. § 3B 1.2(b). 
Loutos contends he should instead get a 4-level 
reduction under § 3B 1.2(a) because he is a minimal 
participant, not just a minor participant. However, 
there is evidence that his participation in the 
investment fraud went beyond helping to open the 
bank account and therefore was not minimal. Again, 
no determination is presently being made as to 
whether Loutos would be entitled to a 2-level 
reduction, 4-level reduction, or no reduction 
whatsoever under § 3B1.2. The issue is noted so that 
the parties will be prepared to address it. 
There is a possible 2-level enhancement for abuse of 
a position of trust. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. There is 
evidence that Loutos used his special skills or public 
trust as an attorney "in a manner that significantly 
facilitated the commission or concealment of the 
offense." Id. See United States v. Foster, 868 F.Supp. 
213, 216-17 (E.D.Mich. 1994) (use of client trust 
account to launder money and aid in establishing 
other accounts for money laundering constituted use 
of special skill and also abuse of public trust); United 
States v. Post, 25 F.3d 599, 600-01 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(violated public trust by using status as attorney to 
shroud insurance fraud claims with appearance of 
regularity); United States v. Ross, 190 F.3d 446, 454 
(6th Cir.), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1033 (1999) (used 
special skill by providing legal assistance to drug 
coconspirators). 
Loutos may be entitled to a 2-level or 3-level 
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reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See 
U.S.S.G. § 3E 1.1. If it is found that the investment 
fraud is relevant conduct, though, Loutos may not be 
entitled to any adjustment for acceptance of 
responsibility because he has continued to deny his 
knowledge of and/or participation in the relevant 
conduct. See United States v. Hernandez, 309 F.3d 
458, 462-63 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. Booker, 
248 F.3d 683, 689 (7th Cir.2001). 
In addition to addressing how these adjustments 
affect Loutos's possible sentencing range, the parties 
should consider, in light of any adjustments based on 
a loss amount or other grounds, a revised fine range 
and the possible applicability of restitution. 
VIII. Practice of Law 
*10 The parties should address the question of 
whether it would be appropriate to prohibit Loutos 
from practicing law during any term of supervised 
release that may be imposed. See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5; 
United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 839 (2d 
Cir.1995). See also United States v. Bernal 183 
F.Supp.2d439(D.P.R.2001). 
IX. Procedures 
By February 3, 2003, the government shall provide 
defendant and the probation officer a copy of the 
government version of the offense that was provided 
to the probation officers for purposes of sentencing 
the codefendants. The government shall also provide 
a supplement to this version specifically setting forth 
any additional facts and issues concerning Loutos. By 
February 24, 2003, each party shall file a sentencing 
memorandum [FN 10] addressing the issues outlined 
in today's order, including delineating any evidence 
that a party believes would need to be presented. By 
March 21, 2003, the probation officer shall provide 
the parties and court with a supplement to (or revised 
version of) the PSR. A status hearing will be held on 
March 26, 2003 at 11:00 a.m. At the status hearing, 
the parties shall be prepared to address any objections 
they may have to die supplemental/revised PSR and 
any need for a hearing on any contested factual 
issues. 
FN10. A copy shall also be provided to the 
probation officer. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that, by February 3, 
2003, the government shall serve defendant and the 
probation officer with a copy of its version of the 
offense as described herein. By February 24. 2003, 
each side shall file a sentencing memorandum. By 
March 21, 2003, the probation officer shall issue a 
supplemental or revised presentence report. Status 
hearing will be held on March 26, 2003 at 11:00 a.m. 
2003 WL 168627 (N.D.IU.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
